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Smith: Criminal Procedure: "Considering the Totality of the Circumstance

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: "CONSIDERING THE
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" IN
DETERMINING PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT BASED ON INFORMANT'S TIP
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)
Acting under a search warrant, police officers seized contraband
discovered in respondents' automobile and home and arrested respondents for violating state drug laws.1 The trial court suppressed
the seized evidence because it concluded the search warrant had been
issued without probable cause.2 The affidavit supporting issuance of
the warrant stated that police had received an anonymous letter detailing the respondents' activities in selling illegal drugs and indicating the date of the next sale.' The affidavit further stated that an
independent police investigation corroborated much of this information. 4 Because the anonymous tip did not establish the basis or reliability of the informant's knowledge, both the appellate court and the
Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court's determination
that probable cause had not been established. On certiorari, the

United States Supreme Court reversed and HELD, the "totality of
the circumstances" must be considered in determining whether an
informant's tip establishes probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant.6
The fourth amendment provides that a citizen's right to privacy
shall not be violated by "unreasonable searches and seizures,"7 nor
1. 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2320 (1983).
2. Id. at 2326.
3. Id. at 2325. On May 3, 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department received an anonymous letter stating that respondents made a living by selling drugs. The letter stated that Sue
Gates typically would drive the car to Florida, leave it, and take an airplane back to Bloomingdale. After the car had been loaded with drugs, Lance Gates would fly to Florida and drive the
car back to Bloomingdale. The letter indicated the next trip would be on May 3. Id.
4. Id. at 2326. Police investigation confirmed that Lance Gates had flown to Florida on
May 5, checked into a motel room registered in his wife's name, and left the motel the next day
with an unidentified woman. Id. at 2325-26.
5. Id. at 2326. The Illinois Supreme Court applied the "two-pronged test" enunciated by
the United States Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 103 S. Ct. at 2326-27.
6. Id. at 2332.
7. The fourth amendment provides in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, -and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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shall a search warrant be issued except upon a showing of "probable
cause." 8 The existence of probable cause is generally determined by a
common sense, nontechnical reading of information provided in the
search warrant application and supporting affidavits.9 Because probable cause is such a flexibly defined standard, 10 courts reviewing probable cause determinations characteristically pay great deference to issuing magistrates."'
In keeping with this deferential approach, Jones v. United
States 2 upheld the issuance of a warrant that was based almost entirely on hearsay statements of a confidential informant.1 3 The SuU.S. CONST. amend. IV.

8. The Supreme Court has repeatedly enunciated a preference for searches pursuant to a
warrant over warrantless searches. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[A]
search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 'per se unreasonable ...
subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.' "). See also
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (searches pursuant to a warrant "are to be
preferred over the hurried actions of officers .... ").
As the court noted in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), this preference does
not deny law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men may draw
from evidence. Rather, a search pursuant to a warrant protects citizens by simply "requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Id. at 13-14.
The probable cause standard is a compromise striking a balance between conflicting
interests.
These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give
leeway for enforcing the law in the community's protection. . . . The rule of probable
cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has
been found for accommodating these often opposing interests. Requiring more would
unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at
the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice.
Id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965) ("affidavits for search
warrants.., must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a common sense and
realistic fashion").
10. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (citing Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that an offense has been or is being committed."
11. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965). "A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants will tend to discourage police officers from submitting
their evidence to a judicial officer before acting. . . . [T]he courts should not invalidate the
warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner."
Id.
12. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
13. Id. at 272. Search warrant applications frequently contain information provided by
informants. See Comment, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search
for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALu L.J. 703, 703 n.3 (1972). For a discussion of informants, see
LaFave, Probable Cause From Informants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 1 n.5.
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preme Court held that hearsay evidence may be considered by the
"so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is
magistrate '14
presented.

In Aguilar v. Texas,15 the Supreme Court explained what would
constitute a substantial basis for crediting hearsay.1" The magistrate
in that case had issued a search warrant based on an affidavit stating
only that "reliable information from a credible person" indicated
that the described premises contained narcotics.17 Reversing defendant's drug conviction, the Court held the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause because it was a "mere conclusion."1 8 For
hearsay evidence to establish probable cause, the affidavit must include the underlying circumstances which caused the informant to
believe a crime was being committed and which led the afflant to
conclude the informant's statements were reliable. 19 Aguilar thus created a two-pronged test for affidavits based on hearsay evidence consisting of a "basis of knowledge" prong20 and a "veracity" prong."'
The Supreme Court elaborated on Aguilar's test in Spinelli v.
14. 362 U.S. at 269.
15. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
16. See Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer,25 MNERCER L. REV. 741, 745 (1974).
17. 378 U.S. at 109.
18. Id. at 113-14. The Court relied on Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)
(invalidating an arrest warrant based on an affidavit which failed to indicate any sources for the
affiant's conclusions) and Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) (invalidating a search
warrant based solely on custom agent's "mere affirmation of suspicion").
19. 378 U.S. at 114.
20. One commentator explains the purpose of this prong as follows: "The 'basis of knowledge' prong assumes an informant's 'veracity' and then proceeds to probe and test his conclusion: ('What are the raw facts upon which the informant based his conclusion?' 'How did the
informant obtain those facts?')." Moylan, supra note 16, at 773.
See also LaFave, supra note 13, at 6. Professor LaFave points out that the most obvious
and direct means of satisfying the "basis of knowledge" prong is to repeat exactly how the
informant claims to have obtained the information given to the officer. For examples, see
United States v. Schauble, 647 F.2d 113 (10th Cir. 1981) (affidavit indicated that informant
personally observed marijuana); United States v. Francis, 646 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1981) (informant personally observed heroin).
21. The "veracity" prong is said to have a "credibility spur" and a "reliability spur," and
thus it can be satisfied either by showing that the informant is generally credible or that the
information on this particular occasion is reliable. Moylan, supra note 16, at 754-55.
The "credibility spur" of the veracity requirement is often satisfied by showing the informant has a "track record" for providing accurate information. LaFave, supra note 13, at 4-5. See,
e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informant's previous tips led to a number of arrests and convictions); United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1980) (informant's past
reliability established). Absent the informant's general credibility, the reliability of the particular information offered may be inferred when the declarations were contrary to the informant's
penal interests. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) ("Admissions of crime, like
admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility... ."). Although
this view may not have been supported by a majority of the court it has been consistently
followed by lower courts. See LaFave, supra note 13, at 5 n.23, 24.
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United States.22 That case involved a search warrant issued on the
basis of an affidavit by FBI agents. 23 The affidavit alleged that agents

had been informed by "a confidential, reliable informant" that petitioner was engaged in illegal gambling and that an independent investigation had revealed that petitioner's apartment contained two
telephones. A search pursuant to the warrant uncovered evidence
which ultimately led to petitioner's conviction for gambling
activities.24
Expressly rejecting a "totality of the circumstances" approach,25
the Spinelli Court reaffirmed Aguilar's two-pronged test as the appropriate method for determining probable cause when hearsay evidence is a crucial element.2 6 The Court explained that the basis of
knowledge prong could be satisfied without a direct statement, provided the tip contains sufficient detail to imply that the information
was obtained in a reliable way.27 Nevertheless, the Court held that
the tip in Spinelli did not in itself meet the Aguilar standard for
probable cause. 28 Extending Aguilar, the Court declared that where
the informant's tip alone is inadequate, corroborating information
may be considered together with the tip in ascertaining whether the
two-pronged test is satisfied.29 The affidavit in Spinelli also failed
22. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
23. Id. at 413-14.
24. Id. at 411.
25. Id. at 415.
26. Id. Although both Aguilar and Spinelli involve search warrants, the "two-pronged
test" is equally applicable to probable cause determinations regarding warrantless arrests and
searches. See, e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (applying the "two-pronged test" to a
warrantless arrest and an incidental warrantless search).
27. 393 U.S. at 416-17. This has been called the "self-verifying detail" technique. See
Moylan, supra note 16, at 749. The Spinelli Court used the tip in Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307 (1959) as a "benchmark." 393 U.S. at 416. In Draper, police received a tip from a
"special employee" of the Bureau of Narcotics that petitioner would be arriving by train on a
certain date carrying three ounces of heroin. The tip identified petitioner's physical description
and the clothes he would be wearing. The tip also indicated that he would be carrying a tan
zipper bag and walking fast. 358 U.S. at 309. The Spinelli Court stated that "[A] magistrate,
when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his
information in a reliable way." 393 U.S. at 417. Draper's finding of probable cause was not
based on this theory, but rather on the fact that police investigation corroborated the informant's tip. 358 U.S. at 313.
28. 393 U.S. at 416-17.
29. Whereas the search warrant in Aguilar was based solely on hearsay evidence, the affidavit in Spinelli contained additional corroborating evidence based on independent investigation. Delineating the manner in which Aguilar's two-pronged test should be applied in this
different circumstance, the Spinelli Court stated that the magistrate must ask: "Can it fairly be
said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources,
is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar'stests without independent corroboration?"
Id. at 415. Again relying on Draper,the Court noted that independent investigation corroborating a detailed tip may support a finding of probable cause. Id. at 417. See supra note 27.
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under this analysis,3" and the Court accordingly reversed petitioner's
conviction.3 1
On facts similar to those of Spinelli, 2 the instant Court again addressed satisfying the fourth amendment requirements when issuing
a search warrant based on hearsay evidence. 3 Reasoning that rigid,
analytical rules were inappropriate for determining probable cause,"
the majority3 5 "abandoned" the Aguilar/Spinelli approach in favor of
a "totality of the circumstances" analysis.36 A finding of probable
cause should be a common sense judgment based on all the circumstances alleged in the affidavit including, but not limited to, the "veracity" and the "basis of knowledge" of informants.'
The instant Court offered several reasons in support of its decision to abandon the Aguilar/Spinelli analysis. The two-pronged test
promotes analytical "dissection" of informants' tips by dividing the
analysis into two isolated investigations. 8 The Court reasoned that
this level of scrutiny conflicts with the traditional notion that reviewing courts should defer to magistrates' determinations.3 9 Moreover,
because anonymous tips seldom satisfy either of the two prongs, this
test hinders law enforcement activities by rendering such tips valueless. 40 Finally, the instant Court suggested that the Aguilar/Spinelli
analysis was too technical for ready application by the many
nonlawyers involved in the warrant process. 41 The Court concluded
that, in view of the totality of the circumstances, probable cause to
and automobile existed and reversed
search the respondents' home
42
the Illinois Supreme Court.
30. 393 U.S. at 416.

31. Id. at 420.
32. Id. at 439. Both Spinelli and the instant case involved partially corroborated tips.
33.

103 S. Ct. at 2321.

34. Id. at 2328-32. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
35. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice White concurred and Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens dissented.
36. Id. at 2332.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2329. The Court stated that the two prongs should not be granted this independent status, suggesting instead that "a deficiency in one may be compensated for in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other." Id.
39. Id. at 2331. The instant Court stated that such scrutiny of magistrates' decisions may
encourage warrantless searches, whereas the "totality of the circumstances" approach "better
serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure and is more consistent
with our traditional deference to the probable cause determinations of magistrates." Id.
40. Id. at 2332.
41. Id. "[A]ffidavits 'are normally drafted by nonlawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation. .. .' Likewise, search and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons
who are neither lawyers nor judges ...... Id. at 2330.
42. Id. at 2336. Considering the substance and detail of the anonymous letter, as well as
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As the instant Court noted, probable cause determinations have
conventionally been made in a practical, nontechnical fashion.4" Useful guidelines for making such determinations, however, do not necessarily preclude this traditional approach. 44 Aguilar and Spinelli devised a structured analysis to assist magistrates in determining
whether hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable. While allowing room
for a common sense determination of overall probable cause, this test
provides a framework for the difficult evaluation of hearsay evidence
and thereby promotes consistent and accurate decisions.45 When
hearsay evidence is essential to a finding of probable cause, the basis
of the informant's knowledge and the informant's credibility should
be assessed. Because these prongs are independently significant,46 a

deficiency in the proof of one should not be overcome by ample proof
of the other.47
The instant Court's criticisms of the two-pronged test are unfounded. Both Aguilar and Spinelli expressly support the traditional
notion that reviewing courts should pay deference to magistrates'
probable cause determinations. 4 Although more structured than a

"totality of the circumstances" approach, the two-pronged test does
not amount to de novo review. 49 In addition, the instant Court incorrectly assumed the Aguilar/Spinelli analysis would render anonythe corroborative evidence supplied by independent investigation, the Court concluded that
probable cause existed. Id. at 2334-36. The majority suggested that the affidavit in the instant
case might have failed under the "two-pronged test." Id. at 2335-36.
43. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
44. See Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415 ("Where, as here, the informant's tip is a necessary
element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more precise
analysis.").
45. "Insofar as it is more complicated, an evaluation of affidavits based on hearsay involves a more difficult inquiry. This suggests a need to structure the inquiry in an effort to
insure greater accuracy. The standards announced in Aguilar, as refined by Spinelli, fulfill that
need." 103 S. Ct. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. See Moylan, supra note 16, at 747.
47. See 103 S. Ct. at 2350 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
[A] finding of probable cause may be based on a tip from an informant "known for the
unusual reliability of his predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest citizen," even if
the report fails thoroughly to set forth the basis upon which the information was obtained. If this is so, then it must follow a fortiori that "the affidavit of an officer, known
by the magistrate to be honest and experienced, stating that [contraband] is located in a
certain building" must be acceptable. . . .It would be "quixotic" if a similar statement
from an honest informant, but not one from an honest officer, could furnish probable
cause. But we have repeatedly held that the unsupported assertion or belief of an officer
does not satisfy the probable cause requirement. . . .Thus, this portion of today's holding can be read as implicitly rejecting the teachings of these prior holdings.
Id.
48. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 419.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2331.
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mous tips valueless." By definition, an anonymous tip could not pass
the two-prongs originally enunciated by Aguilar,5 1 but it could satisfy
that test as extended by Spinelli.5 2 The instant Court's final reason
for abandoning the two-pronged test is equally fallible. Precisely because the warrant process involves many who are neither lawyers nor
judges, 53 a structured approach towards probable cause determinations is desirable. Police officers need to know what to include in an
affidavit, and magistrates need guidance in making their
determinations.
Though preferable to a vague totality of circumstances analysis,
the Aguilar/Spinelli approach is not faultless. Spinelli's version of
the two-prong test, for example, left a number of unanswered questions which have created confusion in lower courts. 55 Rather than
simply abandon the test, the instant Court should have clarified and
explained the points of dispute.5 6 In establishing a different test, the
totality of the circumstances test, the Court offers little guidance and
tremendous discretion for magistrates making probable cause
determinations.
The instant Court's elimination of essential guidelines from probable cause analysis cripples fourth amendment protections. The
probable cause requirement of the fourth amendment aims to protect
citizens from unreasonable invasions of privacy by the government.
This objective is accomplished by requiring a neutral and detached
determination of probable cause before issuance of a search war50. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The instant case is the first time the Supreme Court has considered the two-pronged test's application to tips from anonymous
informants.
51. There is no way of knowing whether an anonymous informant is reliable; and, unless
it is directly stated in the tip, there is no way to determine the basis of the informant's
knowledge.
52. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 41. See, e.g., Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (holding
that municipal court clerks could issue search warrants); State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 216
S.E.2d 501 (1975) (holding that ministerial recorder could issue search warrants).
54. 103 S. Ct. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. For example, the Spinelli Court did not indicate what type of deficiencies corroborative evidence can overcome. The Court declared that it did not believe the FBI's independent
investigative efforts adequately resolved doubts Aguilar raised as to the report's reliability. 393
U.S. at 417. This suggests corroboration is used to overcome deficiencies in the "veracity"
prong. However, the Court continued by stating that the corroborating evidence "cannot by
itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and
that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis of information obtained in a reliable
way." Id. This suggests that corroboration may be used to overcome deficiencies in both prongs.
Similarly, Spinelli does not clarify whether the corroboration must be of incriminating
details or of mere innocent activity. See Note, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for
Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 966-68 (1969). See generally LaFave, supra note 12.
56. For an illustration of how the Aguilar/Spinelli analysis could be applied to the instant case, see Justice White's concurrence, 103 S. Ct. at 2347-50.
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rant.5 7 When the test for determining probable cause lacks substance,
this safeguard is rendered impotent and the requirement of a search
warrant becomes little more than a legal formality.
MICHAEL
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